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NOTE
Value, Work and Women
Whether old or new, labor statistics graphically report the disparity
between women's and men's wages. In 1881, the average daily earnings of
building trades' painters in Pennsylvania was $1.17 for women and
$2.50 for men.' In 1981, the median weekly earnings of women in the
United States who worked at full-time waged jobs was $224. The parallel
figure for men was $347.V This historical disparity between women's and
men's wages is growing.3 Graphic data on sex-based wage disparity
among those employed in the executive branch of Minnesota state
government' recently sparked Minnesota legislators to adopt a new
statute to remedy pay inequity.'
It is the policy of this state to attempt to establish equitable
compensation relationships between female-dominated,' male-
1. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, BuL No. 604, History of Wages in the
United States from Colonial runes to 1928, at 195-98 (1934).
2. Mellor & Stamas, Usual Weekly Earnings: Another Look at Intergroup Differences
and Bask Trends, Monthly Lab. Rev.. Apr. 1982,at 15, 16. (data from the Current
Population urvey by the Bureau of Labpr Statistics, Department of Labor).
3. Although there are slight fluctuations in the increase, the disparity grows. The median
income of women employed full-time was 63% that of full-time male employees in 1956. By
1973 that figure had shrunk to 57%. Ratner, The Policy and the Problem, in Equal
Employment Policy for Women 20 (R. Ratnered. 1980). L Howe, Pink Collar Workers,
289 (1977) (graphic representation). The pay gap between average earnings of Minnesota
employed women and men increased from $4,190 in 1976 to $4,929 in 1981. Minnesota
Council on the Economic Status of Women, Pay Equity and Public Employment, Report of
the Task Force on Pay Equity I (March 1982) [hereinafter Task Force Report).
4. Legislative and judicial employees and members of the Minnesota National Guard are
not executive branch employees. A new statute, see infra note 8, covering approximately
29,000 employees working in law enforcement, craft and maintenance, service, health care,
and corrections' positions deals with wage disparities. Task Force Report, supra note 3, at
14, 15.
5. See Hearings on HI.R 2005 Before the House Committee on Governmental
Operations, 72d Seas., Feb. 18,1982; Watkins, Mineota Passes Comparable Worth
LawJor 36,000 State Employees, Comparable Worth Project Newsletter, Winter 1982, at
1, 13.
6. "temale-dominated class" means any class in which more than 70% of the
incumbents are female. 1982 Minn. Laws 634 § 4.
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dominated,' and balanced classes of employees in the executive
branch. Compensation relationships are equitable within the
meaning of this subdivision when the primary consideration in
negotiating, establishing, recommending, and approving total
compensation is comparability of the value of the work in relation-
ship to other positions in the executive branch.'
Enactments like this have been labeled "comparable worth"
statutes.9 Definitions of "comparable worth" and thus the meaning of
these statutes vary. Similarly, judicial decisions in sex discrimination
actions brought under "comparable worth theories" have resulted in
conflicting judgments with differing rationales. 10 In statutes, judicial
decisions and social commentary, the rubric comparable worth has
meant pay inequity, equal pay for comparable work, equal pay for work of
comparable character, equal pay for work of comparable value and other
notions which juxtapose expressions of equality, comparability, value,
worth, and work." Such confusing and vague terminology limits the
efficacy of comparable worth as a legal remedy.'2 This article examines
and clarifies the language and concepts underlying comparable worth.
Confusion about the definition and legal status of comparable
worth stems from different underlying theories about the causes of sex-
based wage disparities. Many business analysts suggest that wage
disparities are a product of women's employment choices. Their perspec-
7."Male-dominated class" means any class in which more than 80% of the incumbents
are male. 1982 Minn. Laws 634 § 5. "A higher percentage is used for the definition of male
classes than for female classes because there are more men than women in state employment
and in the labor force generally. Therefore, a male class must be 'more segregated' than a
female class in order to be equally out of balance." Task Force Report, supra note 3, at
19.
8. 1982 Minn. Laws 634 § 1.
9. The Comparable Worth Issue, Gov't Empl. ReL Rep. (BNA Special Report) 115-19
(Oct. 26, 1981) [hereinafter BNA Comp. Worth Rep. I.
10. See International Union of Electrical Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 631
F.2d 1094 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981) (after a job evaluation study
rating job classifications, practice of paying female jobs less than male jobs declared
discriminatory); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977) (after a job evaluation
study rating job classifications, practice of paying female jobs less than male jobs
adjudicated nondiscriminatory).
11. BNA Comp. Worth Rep. supra note 9, at 115-19; Manual on Pay Equity: Raising
Wages for Women's Work (J. Grune ed. 1980); H. Remick, Comparable Worth: Equal Pay
for Equal Worth (paper delivered at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the American Association
for Affirmative Action); Goodman, Equal Pay for Work of Equivalent Value, Wash. Post,
May 21, 1977, at All, coL 1.
12. At present no operaiional, practical definition of -comparable worth" exists.
Milkovich, Emerging Debate, in Comparable Worth. Issues and Alternatives 23, 36 (E.
Uvernash ed. 1980). "Comparable worth is a misnomer ...a euphemism. I think it's
basically been used by people to exploit this issue. This is plain old discrimination." BNA
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tive focuses on an individual woman and her choice to take a job at a given
salary as if she were genderless and acting alone. These analysts explain
wage disparities by pointing to individual women's choices not to change
jobs, to work for a wage only occasionally, to work only part-time, or to
work in non-unionized low margin industries like services and textiles."
This perspective assumes each individual woman acts outside any
particular set of pressures or social context.
Law makers and business representatives, most of whom are men,1
4
often view wage disparities from this individualistic perspective. They
focus on women's choices rather than on the reasons for those choices.
Thus, they see wage disparity as the result of women's choices rather than
as the result of discriminaton. From their perspective the causes of wage
disparity are nondiscriminatory. They therefore tend to see sex-based
wage disparities, especially across occupations, as beyond both the reach
of the legal system and the responsibility of employers.
Research contradicts the proposition that isolated, individual job
Comp. Worth Rep., supra note 9, at 53 (quoting former EEOC Vice Chair Daniel Leach).
See Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977) (female university clerical workers
denied a remedy); Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980) (nurses' claim that higher paid jobs were of equal worth to
the city dismissed); Gerlach v. Michigan BeIITel. Co., 501 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Mich. 1980)
(Equal Pay Act standard of substantially similar job duties bars female engineering layout
clerks' claim of sex discrimination based on comparison of traditionally female to
traditionally male jobs and wages within the telephone company); Odomes v. Nucare, Inc.,
653 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1981) (female nurse's aide denied a remedy underTitle VII because
her job duties were not substantially similar job duties of more highly paid male orderly);
Power v. Barry County, Mich., 539 F., Supp. 721 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (female corrections
officers' claim of sex discrimination based on comparable worth dismissed).
13. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Hearings Before the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on Job Segregation and Wage
Discrimination, April 28-30, at 668-76 (1980) (testimony by Virgil Day, Business Round
Table) [hereinafter EEOC Hearings]; Equal Employment Advisory Council, Comparable
Worth: A Symposium on the Issues and Alternatives 65-67 (Nov. 21, 1980) (testimony by
Dr. Herbert Northrup, Professor of Industry, University of Pennsylvania); U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics for 1977 estimated women in unionized jobs averaged $1,500 a year more
in wages and fringe benefits than women in non-union plants or offices. Wertheimer,
Leadership Trainingfor Union Women in the United States: Route to Equal Opportunity,
in Equal Employment Policy for Women (R. Ratner ed. 1980). As of 1982, however, only
15% of wage-earning women were union members. 981 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 21
(Sept. 27, 1982).
14. 79.3% of full-time employed lawyers and judges are men. 71.6% of managers and
administrators are men. These figures do not include self-employed persons. Rytina,
Earnings of Men and Women: A Look at Specific Occupations, Monthly Lab. Rev., Apr.
1982, at 25, 26. [hereinafter Lab. Rev. Earnings]. In 1982, 6,578 (or 88%) of the 7,482
state legislators were men. In 1981, 514 (or 96%) of the 535 federal legislators were men.
National Women's Political Caucus, National Directory of Women Elected Officials 6-10
(1982).
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related choices or job characteristics alone cause the wage disparity
between the sexes." Controlling for number of children, city size,
education, experience, health, work hours, marital status, migration,
region, and union membership, one study found eighty percent of sex-
based wage disparity unexplained.' 6 Based on these studies, some legal
scholars argue wage disparities alone should constitute discrimination
prohibited by law.' 7 Explaining wage disparities as a product of job
choices and characteristics is inadequate for it fails to consider the
pressures behind those choices.
Many public leaders and academics, most of whom are women,"8
see women as a group which functions within a social contexL These
commentators note that the individualistic perspective of wage disparities
obscures the striking differences between wage earning women and men:
women and men work in different occupations 9 and employers pay less
15. See C. Lloyd & B. Niemi, The Economics of Sex Differentiails 232-39 (1979) (citing
twenty different studies which report various percentages of wage disparities unexplained
by job characteristics or employee choices); EEOC Hearings, supra note 13, at 232, 273
(testimony of Mary Corcoran, associate professor of Political Science, University of
Michigan). See also Note: Women, Wages, and Title VII: The Significance of "County of
Washington v. Gunther," 43 U. Pitt. L Rev. 467, 497 n.165 (1982) (economic theories
why employers discriminate).
16. Oaxaca, Male-Female Wage Differentials in the Telephone Industry, in Equal
Employment Opportunity and the AT&T Case 34 (P. Wallace ed. 1976).
,, 17. See Note, Women, Wages., and Tie VI4 supra note 15; Newman & Vonhof,
"Separate But Equal'.-Job Segregation and Pay Equity in the Wake of Gunther, 1981 U.
IL L Rev. 269; Gasaway, Comparable Worth. A Post-Gunther Overview, 69 Geo. L J.
1123(1980-81); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2 Mich. J. L Ref. 399 (1979).
18. E.g.. nearly 90% of those who testified before the EEOC advocating comparable worth
were women. EEOC Hearings, supra note 13.
19. As of 1980,54.7% of employed women were either clerical orservice workers. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, BulL No. 208015, Perspectives on Working
Women: A Databook 102 (Oct. 1980). 95% of the craft workers, 95.3% of engineers and
97.9% of mechanics and repairers are men. Over 90% of telephone operators, bank tellers,
keypunch operators, child care workers, and sewers and stitchers are women. Lab. Rev.
Earnings, supra note 14, at 27-31.
NOTE
for women's work than for men's work.20 They view the existence of men's
jobs and women's jobs as sex-based job segregation. Observing women as
a group in society, these commentators suggest other reasons for wage
disparities. The urgency of economic need often pressures women to work























































Lab. Rev. Earnings. supra note 14, at 26-29. See also Glenn & Feldberg, Degraded and
Deskille- The Proletarianization of Clerical Work, in Women and Work: Problems and
Perspectives 202 (1980) (study of clerical work suggests as it became more routine work,
wages were lowered and field was opened to women).
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highest paying job or to change occupations.2' Bias against women in the
workplace makes it a hostile environment in which to work productively
and thus gain recognition through promotions or merit increases."
Further, the absence of monetary compensation for housework and child
rearing legitimizes the idea that women do not need to be paid for their
work." From these commentators' social perspective, the relationship
between sex-based job segregation and wage disparities creates a need for
related legal remedies.
2 '
The individualistic perspective underlies the traditional legal
concept of comparable worth called equal pay for equal work. This
concept means the same remuneration for the same work performed. Part
I of this article traces the development of this well-accepted doctrine.2"
The social perspective, analyzed in Part III, embodies a concept of
comparable worth not currently legal doctrine. This concept, "pay for the
social value of women's labor," means remuneration based on recogni-
tion of women's contribution to society. Part III of this article also
proposes means to implement this concept.16 The Minnesota statute"
exemplifies a third concept of comparable worth, "comparable pay for
comparable work." This concept means the same remuneration for the
same value of work performed. It straddles the two perspectives. It
envisions the objective of pay for the social value of women's labor but
uses implementation mechanisms and assumptions about comparison,
job evaluation, and wage setting found in equal pay for equal work.
Analysis of the Minnesota statute in Part II demonstrates ho*' the
assumptions underlying the statute's implementation obstruct achieve-
ment of its objective.2
21. See Howe, supra note 3, at 288; Smith, The Movement of Women into the Labor
Force, in The Subtle Revolution 1 (R. Smith ed. 1979). This conclusion also follows from
the increase of women in the wage-earning work force and their increasing poverty.
Ehrenreich & Stallard, The Nouveau Poor, Ms., Aug. 1982, at 217.
22. See C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women, 25-55 (1979) (docu-
menting pressures on women to stay out of the workplace); Coser, Stay Home, Little Sheila.:
On Placement, Displacement, and Social Change, in Women and Work. supra note 20, at
153 (documenting pressures on women to stay in the home).
23. Women and Work, supra note 20, at 137; Glazer, Everyone Needs Three Hands:
Doing Unpaid and Paid Work, in Women and Household Labor 249-70 (S. Berk ed. 1980);
Sawhill, On the Way to Full Equality, in Women in the U.S. Labor Force 40, 52 (A. Cahn
ed. 1979); EEOC Hearings, supra note 13, at 174 (testimony by Helen Hacker, professor of
Sociology, Adelphi University).
24. See supra note 17; EEOC Hearings supra note 13; and Greenberger & Gutman, Legal
Remedies Beyond Title Vlto Combat Sex Descrimination in Employment, in Women in
the U.S. Labor Force 75 (A. Cahn ed. 1979).
25. See infra pp. 165-70.
26. See infra pp. 183-85.
27. 1982 Minn. Laws 634.
28. See infra pp. 170-82.
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The concept of comparable pay for comparable work merely
extends the mechanisms and assumptions inherent in the concept of
equal pay for equal work. Those mechanisms and assumptions make
statutes based on either concept ineffective as a way to redress women's
economic inequality. Nevertheless, promulgating these statutes, even in
their current form, may provide some women with immediate economic
resources. Moreover, attempts to adopt and change such statutes will
focus public attention on assumptions in current legal doctrine which
perpetuate women's economic inequality.
The mechanisms and assumptions in both equal pay for equal work
and comparable pay for comparable work must be challenged and
changed to accomplish the goals of comparable pay statutes. Women"'
must first recognize, define, and value women's contributions to society.
Women can then structure attempts to achieve remuneration for women's
contributions by adapting comparable pay statutes and the mechanisms
inherent in them. Through these efforts women may effectuate meaning-
ful solutions for women's economic inequality and realize pay for the
social value of women's labor.
1. Equal Pay for Equal Work
Equal pay for equal work means the same pay for the same work.
Although this notion has had continuous support from labor and
government officials since the late nineteenth century," federal law did
not require employers to pay the same wages to women and men doing
identical work until 1963. In that year, Congress enacted the Equal Pay
Act (EPA)3 as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of
29. For several reasons, this author suggests women identify with other women to work for
equitable remuneration. Historically, men in control of resources have not recognized and
remunerated women's social contributions. Men may come to support the elimination of the
economic inequality of women, but such support cannot be assumed given this history.
(Men should consider why such a change would be in their interest.) Men may also be less
able to define something which is not theirs, i.e., women's ways of working. Working
together as women, for women, can be revitalizing as well as burdensome. The process is as
important as the end. Through evaluating our circumstances and possible means for
change, we value ourselves.
30. In 1868, the National Labor Union passed a resolution urging Congress to enact
legislation guaranteeing equal pay for equal work for public employees. Buckley. EqualPay
in America, in Equal Pay for Women 35,41-42 (B. Pettman ed. 1975);"As long ago as 1898
a federally appointed industrial commission spoke out in favor of 'equal pay for equal
work.'" BNA Operations Manual, Equal Pay for Equal Work. Federal Equal Pay Law of
1963, at 3 (1963) (hereinafter BNA Equal Pay Manual].
31. "No employer having. employees subject to any provision of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between
NOTE
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1938.11 Through the EPA, Congress proposed to remedy what it perceived
to be a
serious and endemic problem of employment discrimination in
private industry-the fact that the wage structure of 'many seg-
ments of American industry has been based on an ancient but
outmoded belief that a man, because of his role in society, should be
paid more than a woman, even though his duties are the same. "3'
The EPA also requires the same pay when job duties are substan-
tially identical, but not exactly the same. This narrow extension beyond
thie same pay for the same work, for example, provided female workers
with a remedy in Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co. 3" At the glass manufac-
turer's Millville, New Jersey plant, female selector-packers' hourly wage
was ten percent less than that of male selector-packers." Differences in
job duties occurred only during oven shutdowns:
6
During such shutdowns the idled female selector-packers are
assigned to what is known as the "Resort" area, where they inspect
and pack glassware rejected by the Quality Control Inspection
Department. Idled male selector-packers are similarly reassigned to
the Resort area, but some of them are assigned to do work which
otherwise would be done by snap-up boys."
The court held the ten percent wage difference impermissible because
"Congress in prescribing 'equal' work did not require that the jobs be
identical, but only that they must be substantially equal.""' In Schultz, 39
substantially equal meant substantially similar job duties.
Thus, under the EPA, a comparison of job duties determines
whether pay is fair and, therefore, whether there is a need for a legal
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees of the opposite sex in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite
sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal
skill effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.
except where such payment is made pursuant to (1) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system;
(iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
32.29 U.S.C. § § 201 to 219 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
33. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974), citing S. Rep. No. 176,
88th Cong., 1st Seas. 1 (1963).
34. 421 F.2d 259 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
35. 1d. at 261.
36. Differences in job duties must occur more often than occasionally to bar the claim. Id.
at 265 n.10.
37. Id. at 263. Snap-up boys' work was restricted to males by a collective bargaining
agreement. They received two cents more per hour than female selector-packers, and
twenty-one and one half cents per hour less than male selector-packers. Id.




remedy. This comparison process assumes one person's job can and
should be compared to another person's job. It also makes one person's
job and wage the standard for comparison. Under the EPA, men's work is
the standard to which women's work is compared."' If he cuts meat and
she cuts meat but he is paid more than she is, she must compare her work
and wage to his when bringing an action based on the concept of equal pay
for equal work. When there is no "he" with whom to compare a "she,"
however, the EPA provides no remedy. Thus, this comparison procedure
demonstrates the meaning of "equal" in the EPA. Equal means equal to
men.
Despite remedies available under the EPA, wage disparities and job
segregation are growing. Among the ten fastest growing occupations from
1972 to 1980 were four which were approximately ninety percent
female.4 ' In fact, most women work in sex-segregated occupations'
2
where the only men around are supervisors.' 3 Therefore, if the EPA's
comparison procedure is the only method for mobilizing and attaining
equality in wages, most women's economic situation, and consequently
the gap between women's and men's wages, will not change.
The need to more effectively remedy women's economic inequality
has influenced interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII)." This federal statute prohibits employment discrimination
on the basis of sex.'" Although concern over economic inequality of the
sexes has figured in the legislative consideration of Title VII, particularly
upon its amendments," neither the statute nor its legislative history
defines the terms "on the basis of sex" or "discrimination.""4 Thus, until
recently, lower federal court decisions" differed on whether the same pay
40. Prohibitions against lowering one person's wage as a remedy are found in most
employment discrimination statutes including the federal Equal Pay Act and Title VII. This
prohibition also protects the male standard for comparison. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1963).
41. Secretaries 99.3%, cashiers 85.1%, registered nurses 95.8%, and bookkeepers
90.6%. Lab. Rev. Earnings, supra note 14, at 26-29; Leon, Occupational Winners and
Losers: Who They Were During 1972-1980, Monthly Lab. Rev., June 1982, at 18, 19.
42. IL
43. See Barrett, Women in the Job Market. Occupations, Earnings, and Career
Opportunities, in The Subtle Revolution 31, 46 (R. Smith ed. 1979).
44.42 U.S.C. § § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
45. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1976) (emphasis supplied).
46. Pregnancy Discrimination Amendments of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-555,92 Star. 2076
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)). See H.R. Rep. No. 948,95th Cong., 2nd Seas. 2-3
(1978), and S. Rep No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Ses. 2-3. 6 (1977).
47. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 190 n.4 (1981).
48. See supra note 10.
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for substantially similar work limitation of the EPA circumscribed cases
brought under Title VII. The Supreme Court decided that question in
County of Washington v. Gunther."
In Gunther, women employed as jail guards claimed their employ-
er, Washington County, Oregon, had determined that female guards in
county jails should receive ninety-five percent of the wage that male
guards received.SO When the County decided to pay female guards only
seventy percent of what males were paid,5 ' the women filed suit alleging
that the difference in pay constituted intentional sex discriminatin
prohibited by Title VII." All parties agreed *that the job duties were too
dissimilar to fulfill the substantially similar requirement of the EPA."
The district court found that the women's suit could not be brought under
Title VII unless the degree of similarity between job duties fit the EPA
requirement.
5 '
The Supreme Court disagreed. It found the EPA restriction of
substantially similar job duties did not limit sex-based Title VII actions."
The Court explicitly avoided establishing what degree of similarity of job
duties is necessary to establish sex-based wage discrimination cases
under Title VII." As a result, the lower courts now face a new question:
What degree of similarity between job duties does Title VII require to
establish sex-based wage discrimination when job duties are not substan-
tially similar? Although in Gunther, the Supreme Court expressly stated
it was not ruling on the issue of comparable worth," lower courts have
struggled with that notion when presented with discrimination claims
calling for a comparison of job duties which are not substantially similar.
Different decisions espouse different standards. " Thus, the lower courts,
employers, and employees need a uniform standard to establish a sex-
based wage discrimination claim under Title VII, and to remedy
situations where the "male" standard of the EPA is totally inade-
quate.3 9
49. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
50. ld. at 180.
51. The County implemented the full wage increase recommended for male employees but
only 10% of a 30% increase recommended for female employees. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 788, 789 (Or. 1976).
52. 452 U.S. 161,181 (1981).
53. d. at 165.
54. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 788, 801 (Or. 1976).
55. 452 U.S. 161, 181 (1981).
56. Id. at 167 n.8.
57. Id. at 166.
58. EEOC v. Hay Associates, 545 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Power v. Barry County,
Mich.. 539 F. Supp. 721 (W.D. Mich. 1982); Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246 (6th
Cir. 1981).
59. See supra p. 167.
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Judicial interpretation remains a possible source for a Title VII
standard. Other possible sources include the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC),60 federal legislation, or state legisla-
tion. The EEOC, a federal agency, enforces both the EPA and Title VII.6'
Part of its enforcement authority includes setting administrative guide-
lines.' 2 As an interpretation of nondiscrimination, EEOC guidelines
could institute a standard of comparable pay for comparable work as the
minimum requirement for Title VII compliance. The EEOC, however, is
a political entity.' 3 Its policies change with executive administrations.
The current administration is unlikely to promote a standard of compar-
able pay for comparable work;"6 it has retreated from former attempts to
address pay inequities.'"
New federal legislation could also provide a standard. Federal
legislators, for the first time, intend to introduce a comparable pay bill this
session ." The legislative route, however, is at best a long one. Equal pay
bills were introduced in nineteen consecutive Congressional sessions
before passage in 1963."7
Despite the improbability of immediate federal legislation, the
history of the rise of the concept of equal pay for equal work shows that
innovative state legislation sometimes precedes and guides federal law
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.4(a) (1976).
61. Id. § § 2000e-4(a), 2000e-5.
62. Id. § 200e-4(g)(3).
63. The EEOC is a five member board. The President appoints members with the advice
and consent of the Senate. Not more than three members of the board may be members of the
same political party. Id. § 2000e-4(a).
64. EEOC Chairman Clarence Thomas testified at a hearing on Sept. 30, 1982 held by
three house subcommittees under the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.
He said he found the area of comparable worth overwhelming and suggested that the EEOC
would not act on the issue because the state of the law was too unclear. He also noted that
comparable worth cases were likely to be costly class actions which would strain EEOC
resources. Comparable Worth Issue Needs Addressing in Government, Congresswomen,
Unions Charge, 982 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 7.8 (Oct 4,1982). "Clarification is more
likely to come inside a court than from an administrative agency during this administra-
tion." BNA Comp. Worth Rep., supra note 9, at 51 (interview with Eleanor Norton, former
chairperson of the EEOC).
65. See Statement of Assistant Attorney General William Reynolds before House Labor
Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities. 184 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) F-1 (Sept. 23,
1981) (noting the Department ofiustice will no longer support the use of mandatory quotas
or statistical formulas to redress past job discrimination and will emphasize relief for
individual victims as opposed to systemic class-oriented relieO.
66. See statement by Sen. Edward Kennedy at hearings before three subcommittees of the
House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Kennedy Tells Panel Studying Pay
Equity He Will Introduce Comparable Worth Bill 980 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 27
(Sept. 20, 1982).
67. Gitt & Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act Expanding Wage Differential Protections
Under Title VII, 8 Loy. U. Chi L J. 723, 737 (1976-1977).
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makers .6 State legislators embraced the equal pay concept forty-four
years before federal legislators passed the EPA.' 9 Twenty-two states had
statutes providing equal pay for equal work by 1963.70 Many of these
statutes contain the word "comparable," or phrases with similar connota-
tion.7' State legislation like the new Minnesota statute72 may guide federal
law to meaningful remedies for women suffering economic inequality.
II. Comparable Pay for Comparable Work
The concept of comparable pay for comparable work is similar to
the concept of equal pay for equal work. Equal pay for equal work means
the same remuneration for the same work performed. Fairness suggests
employees receive the same pay if their job duties are substantially
similar. A comparison of one job to another reveals the degree of
similarity between jobs. Comparable pay" for comparable work means
the same remuneration for the same value of work performed.74 Fairness
suggests employees receive the same pay if their job duties are of
substantially similar value to the employer. A comparison of one job to
another, by the employer, reveals the degree of similarity between jobs.7
Thus, equal pay for equal work and comparable pay for comparable work
both determine fairness by comparing job duties.
76
68. Id. (detailed summary of the history of the EPA).
69. 1919 Mont. Laws 147 § § 1. 2 (current version at Mont. Code Ann. § 39-3-104
(1982); Mich. Stats. Ann. 28.824 § 556 (1919) (current version at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 750.556 (1968)).
70. See BNA Equal Pay Manual, supra note 30, at 39.
71. Id. at 40-51 (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Montana, Oregon,
Pennslyvania).
72. 1982 Minn. Laws 634.
73. 1 use 'comparable" pay rather than "equal" pay to reflect situations such as Gunther
where actual pay may be a percentage of the pay rate of another job. Also "comparable"
rather than "equal" distinguishes the two concepts and recognizes that the pay, at least by
legal definition, is determined by comparison of one job to another.
74. Similar definitions are often given to the phrase "comparable worth." See Women's
Labor Project of the National Lawyers' Guild. Bargaining for Equality. A Guide to Legal and
Collective Bargaining Solutions for Workplace Problems that Particularly Affect Women
139 (1981).
Although there are many definitions of comparable worth, the quintes-
sential element common to all is that discrimination exists when workers of
one sex in one job category are paid less than workers of the other sex in
another job category and both categories are performing work that is not the
same in content, but is of the 'comparable worth' to the employer in terms of
value and necessity.
Power v. Barry County, Mich., 539 F. Supp. 721, 722 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
75. See infra pp. 171-72.
76. Pay for the social value of women's labor means the same remuneration for similar
contributions performed to further the existence of society. Fairness suggests employees
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The exact connection between value, work, and wages is unknown.
How current wage structures developed is a question historical econo-
mists continue to debate."' Despite the unanswered questions and the
complexity of the issue, employers have used job evaluation systems to
measure, rank and compare jobs for at least one hundred years."
Management consultants originally conceived job evaluation systems as
managerial techniques for arranging jobs in a hierarchy for purposes of
creating pay incentives.79 This methodology of comparing jobs has
become embedded in our legal conceptualization of economic equality in
both equal pay for equal work and comparable pay for comparable work
statutes.
Most job evaluation systems do not attempt to explicitly define
value or worth.'0 Rather, evaluators take for granted that jobs stand in a
hierarchical relationship to one another with respect to the level of pay
each merits." Employers' perceptions of job worth, however, are implicit
in the factors they choose to compare and rank jobs. Generally, job
evaluation systems classify, compare and rank jobs according to four
categories of job content: skill,' effort,' 3 responsibility, 4 and working
conditions.'" Congress adopted these same criteria in the EPA" in
response to industry's well-established commercial practice.'" The
Minnesota statute defines comparability in a similar manner.
receive the same pay if their job duties are of substantially similar value to society. A
comparison of women's labor to men's labor reveals the degree of similarity of value between
jobs.
77. See M. Dobb, Theories of Value and Distribution Since Adam Smith (1973); B.
Csikos-Nagy, Socialist Price Theory and Price Policy (1975); T. Lee, Income and Value
Measurement: Theory and Practice (1975).
78. D. Treiman. Job Evaluation: An Analytic Review. Interim Report to the EEOC 1
(1979) [hereinafter Treiman].
79. Equal Employment Advisory Council Comparable Worth: A Symposium on the
Issues and Alternatives 27 (Nov. 21, 1980) (testimony by Dr. Donald Schwab, professor,
University of Wisconsin).
80. Treiman, supra note 78, at 31.
81.Id.
82. "Skilr' is the complexity of the operation or task, the total knowledge and skills needed
for acceptable performance. Id. at 21, 32.
83. "Effort" is dynamic and static. In some systems, it is the amount of original self-
starting thinking required by the job for analyzing, evaluating creating, reasoning and
arriving at conclusions. Id.
84. "Responsibility" is the risk of causing loss or damage, and answerability for actions
and their consequences. Id.
85. Generally. "working conditions" applies only where there is environmental hardship
and risk of health or life of the worker, physical effort, disagreeableness of environment and
hazards are factors. Id. But see infra p. 172.
86. See supra note 31.
87. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 199-202 (1974).
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Comparability of the value of the work means the value of the work
measured by the composite of the skill, effort, responsibility, and
working conditions normally required in the performance of the
work.U
Thus, both equal pay for equal work and comparable pay for comparable
work entail a process of comparing which scrutinizes the same four
criteria of job content."'
Both concepts also embody the same standard of comparison.
Implicit in job evaluation systems is "a" standard which is "the"
standard, i.e., "his" standard found in the concept of equal pay for equal
work. Interpretations of "skill" demonstrate this standard. Skill is more
often measured in terms of experience than in terms of formal educa-
tion.'0 Women's work often has no requirement of prior experience so it
receives less points than men's work." Manual skill means ability to
handle tools rather than manual dexterity.'2 This definition downgrades
fine assembly work, done largely by women. Defining interpersonal skill
as negotiation rather than as conciliation or counseling has the same
effect.' 3 Each factor contains "his" standard. Manual effort," for
example, is usually measured by strength requirements rather than
fatigue levels. Consequently, predominately male blue-collar jobs will
almost invariably score higher on the effort factor than predominately
female blue-collar jobs.95 Responsibility means supervisory and budget
control rather than organizing.' 6 Women organize; men supervise."
Working conditions for low level office workers are not considered by
evaluators. The difference between windowed and windowless offices,
however, is taken into account for executive positions." Most secretaries
are women, most executives are men." Thus, the definition of working
conditions as well as the other criteria comprising job content do not
include women's experience as women workers.
88. 1982 Minn. Laws 634 § 3.
89. Wage structures need not necessarily focus on job content. In Japan they are based on
the jobholder's characteristics. e.g., age and education. Marsh & Mannari, Pay and Social
Structure in a Japanese Fum, 12 Indus. ReL, Feb. 1973. at 16-32.
90. Treiman. supra note 78, at 10, 32.
91. Id. at 10.
92.Id. at 32.
93. 1l
94. Systems originally designed for evaluating managerial systems often lack specificity
necessary to evaluate effort in manual positions. Id. at 23. See supra note 83.
95. Treiman, supra note 78, at 32.
96. Id.
97. Id at 32-33.
98. Id at 33.
99. See supra note 14 and note 20.
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Comparable pay statutes implementing data from current job
evaluation studies devalue women's work simply by their definition of
what work is and what work is given value. The goal of comparable pay
statutes is to value women's work.' ® To achieve this goal, the definitions
evaluators and legislators use to describe, and thus to value work, must
incorporate rather than exclude women's experience as women
workers.
Job evaluation ultimately rests on someone's judgment. Someone
decides which factors to use as measuring sticks. Someone writes job
descriptions or interviews an employee for information about the work
required in a position.' 0 ' Someone assigns a numerical value to each
criterion of job content for each job. Someone then matches each job's
point counts with wages and salaries.' 02 That someone is the employer or
his agents: consultants hired to implement the job evaluation system'03 or
supervisors trained by the consultants.' 0' Exclusive employer control
over the evaluation process impacts negatively on women in at least two
100. E.g., infra pp. 177-78.
101. Treiman, supra note 78, at 39.
102. Id. at 8-29.
103. The state of Minnesota, for example, hired Hay Associates, an international manage-
ment consultant which has done job evaluation studies of businesses and governments
world wide. See EEOC v. Hay Associates, 545 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (E.D. Ps. 1982). The
Minnesota study was largely completed from 1978 to 1979. Funds for continuing
evaluation of job classifications not yet evaluated are a regular budgetary item in the
Department of Employee Relations. Interview with Catherine Warrick, Director of
Affirmative Action, Department of Employee Relations, Member of the Task Force on Pay
Equity, in St. Paul, Minnesota (Sept. 16, 1982). "Of the 1,673 job classes in the state
goverdment, 762 have been assigned points under the Hay job evaluation system . . .
jobs which have not yet been evaluated are primarily those of unclassified managers and one
person classes . . . only eight percent of those with ten or more incumbents have not yet
been evaluated .... " Task Force Report, supra note 3, at 19. Even when consulting firms
evaluate jobs it is the employer who decides which firm will conduct the evaluation. Also,
until the Minnesota statute, it was the employer alone who determined how or whether to use
data produced by job evaluations to change or set wages. Data from the study in Minnesota
was released to a task force created to study the economic plight of state employees in 1981.
Task Force Report, supra note 3.
104. Job evaluators train supervisors of the employee positions to collect data on the jobs'
contents. Even interviews prove inadequate to educate the supervisor as to the job content of
many, especially clerical positions. Task Force Report, supra note 3, at 11; Treiman, supra
note 78, at 39. Part of the problem may be intimidation of employees in on-the-spot
interviews which seem more like interrogations. Interview with Carol Flynn, Assistant
Director of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) Council 6, Member of the Task Force on Pay Equity, in St. Paul, Minnesota
(Sept. 16, 1982). Also, women tend to underestimate their jobs when asked to evaluate or
describe them. Equal Pay for Women Will Be Gained in Public Sectr Bargaining,
Speakers Saf, 963 Gov't Emp. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 21 (May 17, 1982) (statement by Debby
King, University of Connecticut Labor Education Center representative).
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ways. First, women's work is pigeonholed rather than evaluated thus
maintaining the status quo."0 ' Second, positions held by women are
systematically valued lower than positions held by men. Evaluators value
women less than men because women, as women, are valued less than
men.'
06
Job evaluation systems pigeonhole, rather than evaluate, women's
work. Typically, employers use job evaluation systems to rationalize
existing wage structures. 07 Evaluators use guide charts in assigning
numerical values for job duties.0 8. These charts sometimes assign a
numerical value to certain jobs as an example to guide the person
conducting the evaluation.' 09 Thus, the evaluator may "know" before
conducting the evaluation that Clerk I positions correspond to XX points.
Women's jobs are also pigeonholed rather than evaluated because of a
lack of specificity in lower level job descriptions." 0 Less specific
descriptions lead to lower point counts because it appears that there is
little content in the undefined or ill-defined job. To overcome this
invisibility, women must define their work with specificity and inform
employers and evaluators about that work.
Numerous studies provide overwhelming evidence that female
workers are less highly regarded than male workers with identical
experience."' Female work products are also rated lower than male work
products even when the work product is the same."' Job evaluation
systems which do not recognize this phenomena produce male advantage
and female disadvantage solely on the basis of gender. Employer defined
and implemented job evaluation systems have failed to remedy this
inherent bias. Women's" ' efforts to define their work and adapt
evaluation systems can begin to change how women are viewed as women
workers.
. Eighteen states"' have enacted laws which may be categorized as
comparable pay statutes. The language in these statutes varies, as does
105. See infra.
106. See infra.
107. Treiman, supra note 78, at 4.
108. Id. at 21-23.
109. Interview with Bonnie Watkins, Program Associate, Minneapolis Council on the
Economic Status of Women, in St. Paul, Minnesota (Aug. 31, 1982).
110. Treiman, supra note 78. at 39.
111. Id. at 43-45.
112. EEOC Hearings, supra note 13, at 147,152 (testimony by Ann Viviano, instructor of
Psychology, Pace University).
113. See supra note 29.
114. Alaska Stat. § 18.80.220(5) (1981); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-624 (1967); Cal. Gov't
Code § 19827.2 (West Supp. 1981); Ga. Code § 54-1003 (Supp. 1982); Idaho Code § 44-
1702 (1977); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 337.423 (1983); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 628 (1974);
Md. Ann. Code art. 100 § 55A (1979); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § IOSA (Supp. 1982);
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the terminology describing comparable worth."' Perhaps most legisla-
tors intended to insure equal pay for equal work.' 6 Most of these statutes,
however, function as more or less hollow policy statements rather than as
rigorously applied standards for regulating wages.'7 They are also
inadequate because they lack mechanisms for implementing comparable
pay adjustments." 8
New statutes in Idaho and Minnesota attempt to correct deficiencies
in implementation of comparable pay adjustments for public sector
employees.' 9 The Idaho statute provides that the Idaho Personnel
Commission determine relative compensation rates for different job
classifications through a job evaluation system. 2 0 Implementation
remains totally under the state employer's control. The Minnesota statute
establishes a procedure for identifying job classifications in need of
adjustment,'' with control shifting to the collective bargaining process
2 2
after identification and appropriation of funds by the legislature.
2 3
Minnesota employees, through their collective bargaining agent, now
have a voice in the process which determines who actually receives
comparable pay adjustments.' 2' This unique transfer of power poses new
opportunities and new pitfalls for ameliorating the economic status of
women through legislation.
Theoretically, the collective bargaining process enters into the
1982 Minn. Laws 634; Mont. Code Ann. § 39-3-104 (1981); Neb. Rev. Star. § 48-1219
(1978); N.D. Cent. Code § 34-06.1-03(1975); Okia. Stat. tit. 40 § 198.1b(Supp. 1982);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.220 (1982); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 66-12-15 (1978); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 50-321 (1977); W. Va. Code § 21-5B-3 (1981).
115. BNA Comp. Worth Rep., supra note 9 3 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) q 20,080
(1980).
116. Interview with Bonnie Watkins, supra note 109.
117. These statutes had the reputation of being merely pious statements of the legislature or
just good advice. BNA Equal Pay Manual, supra note 30, at 32.
118. BNA Comp. Worth Rep., supra note 9, at 115-19.
119. Idaho Code § 67-5309B (Supp. 1982); 1982 Minn. Laws 634.
120. Idaho Code § 67-5309B(a) (Supp. 1982).
121. 1982 Minn. Laws 634 § § 6-8.
122. Job classifications are grouped together along occupational lines into bargaining units.
Minn. Stat. § 179.71 subd. 3 (Supp. 1981). Employees in these bargaining units elect a
union to represent them in contract negotiations and grievance procedures. Id. § 179.61-
179.76. As of March 1982, 29,000 employees of the State of Minnesota had formed 16
separate bargaining units and elected union representatives. Task Force Report. supra note
3, at 14. Managers, confidential employees, certain physicians, constitutional officers, and
employees involved in mediation and arbitration for state employees are excluded from all
bargaining units. Minn. Stat. § 179.74 subd. 4 (Supp. 1982).
123. 1982 Minn. Laws 634 § § 6-8.
124. This assumes employees' voices get through the union hierarchy. Even in unions with
predominately female members, few if any women are found in top positions. Wertheimer,
supra note 13, at 229.
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distribution of funds only after identification of "underpaid" ' job
classifications and an appropriation by the Minnesota legislature.'2 6 The
statute carefully delineates the steps preceding collective bargaining
action. The Commissioner of the Department of Employee Relations
submits a report to the legislative commission on employee relations.'".
This report contains a list of all job classifications in which a compensa-
tion inequity exists, and an estimate of the appropriation necessary for
providing comparability adjustments for all classes on the list.'
Findings from data produced by a job evaluation study'2 9 form the basis
for this information.'30 The commission can approve, disapprove, or
modify either the list or the proposed appropriation. Its recommendation
goes before the full legislature for approval, rejection, or modification by
March 1 of every odd-numbered year.' 3 '
Funds earmarked by the legislature for comparable pay adjust-
ments are generated from an open appropriation for wage increases and
employee compensation benefits such as cost of living increases."' This
fund does not include regular salaries and wages which are appropriated
for separate department budgets. "I Comparable pay adjustments are not
paid directly to those employees working in underpaid job classifications.
Rather, each bargaining unit receives
that proportion of the total proposed appropriation which equals the
number of positions in the unit . . . approved by the commis-
sion'' for comparability adjustments divided by the total number
of positions on the list approved by the commission for comparabili-
ty adjustments."'
Thus, if the legislature allocates five million dollars for comparable pay
adjustments and one collective bargaining unit has ten percent of the total
125. "Underpaid" means paid less than other job classifications which have the same or
fewer Hay points. See supra pp. 171.173.
126. 1982 Minn. Laws 634 § 8.
127. The governor appoints this commissioner. Minn. Stat. § 42A.03 subd. 2 (Supp.
1981). This legislative commission is a twelve member joint committee of the state
legislature that gives interim approval of labor agreements after adjournment of the full
legislature, monitors the state's civil service system, and studies statutes regulating the
state's employment practices. Minn. Stat. § 3.855 (Supp. 1982).
128. 1982 Minn. Laws 634 § 6.
129. See supra note 103.
130. Interview with Catherine Warrick, supra note 103; Interview with Bonnie Watkins,
supra note 109.
131. 1982 Minn. Laws 634 § 8.
132. See 1979 Minn. Laws 332 art. 1 § 115; 1981 Minn. Laws 356 § § 61-62.
133. Interview with Carol Flynn, supra note 104.
134. This passage is inconsistent as it does not mention possible modifications by the full
legislature as allowed by the preceding passage in the statute.
135. 1982 Minn. Laws 634 § 6.
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number of people in need of pay adjustments, it will receive $500,000 to
distribute to employees in any appropriate classification. Assuming the
legislature appropriates only a portion of the funds needed to establish
equity in all underpaid classifications,' 36 "distribution of any appropri-
ated funds within each bargaining unit . . . shall be determined by
collective bargaining agreements . *."..'"" Within collective bargain-
ing units, negotiations between the certified union representative and the
employer determine which of the appropriate job classifications receives
what portion of the unit's comparable pay funds. In these negotiations the
Commissioner of the Department of Employee Relations acts as the
employer on behalf of the state. "'
Funds appropriated for comparable pay adjustments can be
divided among appropriate job classifications within each collective
bargaining unit in different ways. Due to the special objectives of labor
and management, either may bargain for the bulk of the funds for the
"most" underpaid job class, i.e., the job class within the bargaining unit
which the job evaluation study showed to have the lowest salary when
compared with other jobs with the same or lower point counts. Other
options include across-the-board increases for all employees in targeted
positions, pay adjustments for job classes in which incumbents have
morale problems, or increases in job classes with the lowest annual
salaries of any targeted jobs.' 39
The legislative objective of the statute is to increase the wages of
women in sex-segregated, low-paying, and traditionally. undervalued
positions. Previous legislative action,1"0 testimony during legislative
committee hearings,"' and the statute's statement of purpose" 2 articulate
136. See infra pp. 181-82. Pay equity adjustments for the 1983-85 biennium are estimated
at $20 to $40 million, two percent to four percent of the projected state budget. Task Force
Report, supra note 3, at 24.
137. 1982 Minn. Laws 634 § 6.
138. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 43A.06 subd. (3) (West supp. 1982).
139. Interview with Catherine Warrick, supra note 103.
140. The Minnesota legislature established an advisory council on the economic status of
women in 1976. It became a permanent agency in 1981. Ten legislative representatives, and
eight members of the public are appointed by the governor for two year terms.
The council . . . studlies] all matters relating to the economic status of
women in Minnesota, including economic security of homemakers and
women in the labor force, opportunities for educational and vocational
training, employment opportunities, the contributions of women to the
economy, their access to benefits and services provided to citizens of this
state, and laws and business practices constituting barriers to the full
participation of women in the economy.
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 3.9222 subd. 3 (West Supp. 1982).
141. Hearings on H. B. 2005 before the House Committee on Governmental Operations,
72d Sess., Feb. 18, 1982 (statement by Nina Rothchild, former executive secretary of the
Minnesota Council on the Economic Status of Women, current Commissioner of Employee
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this objective. Placing part of the implementation process on the
collective bargaining table adds other objectives to the statute. Negotia-
tors from the Department of Employee Relations (hereinafter "manage-
ment"), and unions representing employees in bargaining units,4 have
their own objectives to pursue and problems to avoid in connection with
the comparable pay adjustments.
Management hopes that instituting comparable pay for comparable
work adjustments will correct the previously unsuccessful attempts
during the collective bargaining process to produce pay equity for
everyone employed in the executive branch of state government.'"
"When the rewards system matches what people do, turnover goes down,
morale goes up and there are less problems with discrimination claims.
Fair treatment increases production."145 Thus, management's objective is
increased production by means of an environment in which employees
perceive that the pay they receive is fair.
Compression of job hierarchies is an additional management
concern connected with comparable pay adjustments.'" Compression
occurs when steps or levels in a career advancement plan are lost."1
7 If the
Clerk I classification receives comparable pay adjustments but the Clerk
II position does not, the difference in responsibilities between the two
positions will remain while the difference in salary will become negligible.
Employees in Clerk I positions will have little incentive to move up the
career ladder. Such destruction of the salary ranking also undermines the
managerial objective of promoting employees' perceptions of fair treat-
menL
Another management concern is union use of whipsaw tactics to
gain wage increases.'"S In response to the possibility of comparable pay
adjustments for female units, male-dominated bargaining units are sure
to fight hard for salary increases. The whipsaw is one tactic they can use to
attempt to gain those increases.'" The whipsaw effect occurs after one
bargaining unit has been granted a benefit. Other units hold out for higher
Relations and J. Geisher, former chief negotiator for the State of Minnesota.)
142. See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
143. See Task Force Report, supra note 3, at 15.
144. In 1973 the state civil service system became a professional management system.
Changes included a schedule of consistent and systematic performance evaluations and
progressive discipline. Interview with Catherine Warrick, supra note 103.
145. 1&
146. Interview with Catherine Warrick, supra note 103.
147. Id.
148. "Whipsaw" is a traditional labor term for collusive action by two unions against a
common employer or an employer group. See International Ass'n of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers v. National Ry. Labor Conference, 310 F. Supp. 905, 910 n. 5 (D.C.
1970); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 90 n. 7 (1957).
149. Id.
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or at least similar benefits because the former agreement provides a sense
that everyone should receive the same. The possibility of a strike
increases and the employer faces unpleasant alternatives. For example, if
a female unit receives a comparable pay increase, a male unit may
negotiate for some compensation to balance the benefit going to women.
Moreover, if one male unit achieves a benefit to compensate them because
female units are receiving comparable pay adjustments, other male units
may hold out for the same benefits. This scenario would simply
perpetuate women's economic inequality and thwart the purpose of
comparable pay adjustment: paying women for their contribution to
society.
Union objectives in implementing the Minnesota statute include
increased wages, more cohesive action in certain bargaining units, and
higher union membership. Any implementation of comparable pay
adjustments accomplishes the traditional union goal of raising wages.
Union leaders involved in passage of the statute also hope that the issue of
comparable pay can create a focal point for cohesive action at the
bargaining table for units that have lacked unity in previous negotia-
tions.'5 0 Additionally, comparable pay is a rallying topic for union
organizers attempting to increase union membership.'
Unions also confront problems created by the statute. Unions
representing both female and male bargaining units, for example, face
traditional problems of raiding"s2 and fulfilling the duty of fair representa-
tion. ' One union reported raiding by another union immediately after
enactment of the statute."" The raiding union claimed it would protect the
interests of men better than the union which had worked for passage of the
bilL'" State employed males may also question whether their union is
fulfilling its obligation to represent all employees equally ' 6 by negoti-
ating for comparable pay adjustments which benefit women. Traditional-
ly, however, unions have ignored women workers' interests when they
conflicted with men's interests." 7 Thus, comparable pay may be seen as
150. Interview with Carol Flynn, supra note 104.
151. Id.
152. "Raiding" is an attempt by one union to organize and represent employees already
represented by a different union. See United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers Union, 258
F.2d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 1958).
153. Part of a union's duty of fair representation is the requirement that bargaining
positions be based on good faith consideration of the interests of all the employees
represented by the union. See M. Lieberman, Public Sector Bargaining: A Policy
Reappraisal 110-11 (1980). Cf. Truck Drivers Local Union v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) (union action benefiting as many employees as possible is permissible).
154. Interview with Carol Flynn, supra note 104.
155. d.
156. See supra note 153.
157. E.g. B. Wertheimer, We Were There. The Story of Working Women 199-208 (1977)
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compensation for past discrimination and an attempt to best represent the
interests of all by working for equality between the sexes.
At the bargaining table, each party will have to prioritize. compar-
able pay objectives and concerns with their other interests. Similarly, a
variety of concerns will influence management and labor actions during
discussions in the legislature preceding appropriations. Legislators
control all financial allocations from the state treasury."' Therefore,
including collective bargaining at any stage of the implementation
process of comparable pay adjustments for public employees will
inevitably trigger lobbying.
Under the statute, comparable pay adjustments must come from
the same "pot of gold" as other incidental salary increases.' " If the
legislature appropriates no funds for comparable pay adjustments, all
employees can bargain for their share of the whole pot rather than just
their share of the pot remaining after removal of the comparable pay
appropriations. Looking at the practical effect of comparable pay, men in
overpaid jobs and unions representing bargaining units composed of
overpaid job classifications may lobby against a comparable pay
appropriation to protect their own interests.
This "same source" problem will also affect the lobbying efforts of
the Commissioner of Employee Ralations. Management officials lobbied
for the inclusion of balanced, non-sex-segregated,'" job classifications in
the policy statement of the statute because pay inequities also exist in
those classifications."6 Employees in balanced job classifications may
see advocacy for comparable pay adjustments as a lack of consideration of
(discussion of unequal treatment of women workers by men controlling the American
Federation of Labor 1886-1910).
"Restrictions on discrimination have not contributed to any substantial
improvement in the relationship between women and unions. From 1962 to
1976 female union membership increased from 19 to 22 percent. However,
twenty-five unions account for half this membership, and only 7 percent of
leadership positions are held by women, hundreds of whom annually file
charges of sex exclusion, discrimination or prejudicial classification against
unions."
J. Kenneally, Women and American Trade Unions 190 (1978).
158. Minn. Const. art. IX, § 9.
159. 1982 Minn. Laws 634 § 8. Cost of living raises and other salary adjustments are paid
out of the treasury through the supplemental appropriation. A minimum pay equity
adjustment, one which only raises all targeted positions to parity with the lowest salary for a
male job with the same Hay point count, would be 13% of the original 1981-1983
supplemental salary appropriation. 1981 Minn. Laws 356 § 62.
160. " 'Balanced class' means any class in which no more than 80 percent of the incumbents
are male and no more than 70 percent of the incumbents are female." 1982 Minn. Laws 634
§ 2. See also, supra notes 6-7.
161. The need for prorated fringe benefits for part-time employees is one example of other
pay equity adjustments. Interview with Catherine Warrick, supra note 103.
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pay inequities applicable to them. This perception would taint manage-
ment's image of fair treatment.
A larger than normal allocation of state funds to the supplementary
salary appropriation with the increase slated for comparable pay
adjustments would resolve many of the concerns of management, unions
and overpaid employees. Unfortunately, other forces are likely to prevent
an increased allocation. Private sector businessmen oppose comparable
pay for comparable work as governmental interference with market
forces."62 Fear of possible spillover into the private sector"63 through
comparable pay strikes or legislation directed at the private sector may
motivate private employers to oppose and lobby against comparable pay
adjustments.' 6 Moreover, the state's economic situation reflects the
national recession.' 6S For legislators in this environment, wage increases
to achieve comparable pay for comparable work are too easily seen as a
salary increase to be denied rather than back pay for long overdue
debts.
Securing and retaining' 66 an adequate appropriation for compar-
able pay adjustments is doubtful. Washington state exemplifies this
problem. In 1974 the state pioneered the use ofjob evaluations to identify
job segregation and wage discrimination." 7 The Washington State study
showed "that overall, women received about 20% (approximately $175
per month) lower pay than men for comparable work .... ,"'6 The
162. See National Public Employer Labor Relations Association Testimony on Com-
parable Worth Before Joint U.S. House Subcommittee on Pay Equity, 992 Gov't EmpL.
ReL Rep. (BNA) 47 (Dec. 13, 1982); Equal Employment Advisory Council, Comparable
Worth. A Symposium on the Issues and Alternatives (1981). (The EEAC is an association
organized in 1976 to promote the common interest of employers and the public on issues of
discrimination and equal pay.).
163. At least one large private sector employer in Minnesota attempted implementation of
comparable pay adjustments in light of the new enactment. Interview with Bonnie Watkins.
supra note 109.
164. E.g., "Private industry groups put heavy pressure on the mayor of San Jose not to give
in to AFSCME Local 101 during a nine-day strike by the . . . [public employee union in
1981 ]." Equal Payfor Women Will Be Gained In Public Sector Bargaining Speakers Say,
963 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 20 (May 17,1982). Seealso D. Tice, Comparedto What?,
Corporate Report-Minnesota, Feb. 1983, at 6. 16.
165. See Minnesota Delp't of Finance, Annual Financial Report (June 30, 1982).
166. What appears in the statute as a linear chronology will actually happen concurrently.
Appropriations decisions and contract negotiations occur from January to June of every
odd-numbered year, The supplemental benefits appropriation has occurred at the very end
of the last two legislitive sessions. Contract agreements prior to this appropriation will be
contingent upon such an appropriation. See 1979 Minn. Laws 332 art. I § 115; 1981
Minn. Laws 356 § § 61-62.
167. Task Force Report, supra note 3, at 6.
168. A Brief Summary of Comparable Worth, Report by the Washington Federation of
State Employees AFL-CIO (Sept. 16, 1981) (emphasis deleted).
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Washington state legislature, however, has yet to allocate funds to correct
the continuing inequity. 69 Similarly, the Minnesota statute does not
require an appropriation.'"0 Nevertheless. the combined commit-
ments of labor leaders, managers, and legislators who worked for passage
of the statute '' promise some kind of appropriation. If these promises
hold out, the question becomes how much of an appropriation can be
expected in light of each group's particular constraints.
Enactment of the Minnesota statute was both a gain and a loss for
female employees in collective bargaining units in the state executive
branch. The statute now defines and in essence limits allocations for
comparable pay adjustments. The legislative appropriation publicly
prioritizes comparable pay adjustments with other demands on state
funds. Gaining comparable pay adjustments at the bargaining table
above those in the appropriation is impossible. Thus, the legislative
allocation constrains women seeking comparable ,pay adjustments no
matter how strong their bargaining strength or how small the appropri-
ation.
Indeed, this legislation relegates women to the status of an interest
group competing for scarce resources. Women control few levers of power
with which to compete as an interest group." 2 This is one reason
comparable pay statutes are needed. Without such levers, however,
women may not obtain what the Minnesota statute envisions, for a small
appropriation, split between many employees, will not change the status
quo of wage disparities nor aid women in financial straits.
169. AFSCME Memorandum in Support of Comparable Worth Charge Against
Washington State, 932 Gov't EmpL Rel. Rep. (BNA) 36 (Oct. 12. 1981). Questions raised
about comparability of job content as to lower level positions did not deter implementation
of adjustments recommended for upper level management jobs, including the Governor's
positions, in Washington state. The same consultant used the same methodology to study
and compare all positions evaluated. G. Taber & H. Remick, Beyond Equal Pay for Equal
Work. Comparable Worth in the State of Washington 12 (May 1978) (paper presented at the
Conference on Equal Pay and Equal Opportunity Policy for Women in Europe, Canada,
and the United States, Wellesley College. Wellesley, Massachusetts).
170. 1982 Minn. Laws 634 § 6.
171. Members of the Task Force on Pay Inequity included legislators, labor, public, and
management leaders. The group focused on options for changing inequalities as established
by the job evaluation study in a non-adversarial forum conducive to concession and
resolution. With data from the study as a base, the group agreed on a plan for implementing
comparable pay. Interview with Bonnie Watkins,supra note 109. Task Force Report, supra
note 3.




111. Pay for the Social Value of Women's Labor
Comparable pay for comparable work statutes recognize only the
social value of men's labor. Men define work. Men's experience as male
workers defines what they see and value as work. Both the comparison
procedure of the Equal Pay Act and the descriptions of work in job
evaluation systems perpetuate male work as the standard to which men
compare everyone else. Seen from this perspective, the wage disparity
between women's and men's wages is not surprising.
Women work. Women contribute to the ongoing existence of
society. Pay for the social value of women's labor means remuneration for
women's contribution to society. It encompasses and embodies women's
experience as women workers. To achieve that goal women first must
recognize that male-defined society does not currently remunerate
women's contributions. Next, women must articulate and specify how
women work and what work women do. Women must then fight for
remunerations for these contributions. Changing job evaluation systems
on which comparable pay statutes are based, and adopting such statutes
with more women-defined and controlled implementation processes, can
help women achieve pay for the social value of women's labor.
Comparable pay statutes are one method to reach that goal. Current
comparable pay statutes should provide some economic aid to at most a
few women. A transfer of economic resources to women is needed to
change the current economic imbalance between the sexes. To receive
meaningful appropriations for comparable pay adjustments women must
educate legislators about the realitites of women's situation. Moreover, all
involved in the statute's implementation process must focus on the goal of
pay for the social value of women's labor to overcome barriers embedded
in that process. Unlike the discretionary funding allowed by current
comparable pay statutes, future enactments should require legislative
appropriations. Such requirements will more effectively assist changing
the economic inequality between the sexes.
Future enactments must also compensate more women. The
Minnesota statute covers only a small number of women.'"1 Coverage
should be extended to all female employees in the public sector. Other
states' equal pay statutes should also be adapted to reach the economic
situation of more women. Changing existing equal pay statutes by adding
mechanisms to implement comparable pay for comparable work would
173. The statute does not even cover all women employed in the executive branch.
Employees at the state university system are exempted. 1982 Minn. Laws 634 § 9.
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create remedies for women now excluded from redress because of the
restrictive comparison procedure in such statutes.' 74 Legislation must
also address the economic situation of those women who work without
remuneration'" to change the state of economic inequality.
Current comparable pay statutes are valuable not only because
they transfer economic resources to some women, but also because they
provide impetus for change. They focus public attention on women's
economic inequality. Hopefully, this will prompt legislative action that
provides remedies to affect large numbers of women. Further, current
statutes provide a starting point for action. Women can add implementa-
tion mechanisms to existing statutes-a less onerous task than starting
from scratch. Likewise, women can change job evaluation systems. Such
efforts will be instrumental for achieving recognition and remuneration of
women's contribution to society.
The concept of comparable pay for comparable work uses job
eualuation systems to implement economic equality. MS Job evaluation
itself is not the cause of women's lower status in the economic hierarchy.
Rather, the exclusive maleness of job evaluation systems and their use
produces devaluation of women's work. Thus far, neither equal pay for
equal work nor comparable pay for comparable work statutes have
questioned either who makes the evaluation or what is considered
valuable when men compare job duties and assign wages. Women must
reshape job evaluation systems to overcome the individualistic perspec-
tive of discrimination and "equality" which reinforces rather than
changes inequality.
Women must define what work is and what work is valuable in
order to eliminate male advantage entrenched in most job evaluation
s stems. Women can begin by recognizing and defining the form and
substance of women's work. Women then must add, to what men now
reward as work, new criteria and definitions which account for women's
contributions.'" More input from women employees during the process
of gathering information about a job is crucial to obtaining remuneration
which reflects women's contributions to society.
174. Adapted mechanisms are also needed in new comparable pay statutes. e.g., Cal. Gov't
Code § 19827.2 (West Supp. 1981).
175. See supra note 23.
176. Some courts continue to miss the significance of a prior employer determination of
value of job duties when discussing the courts' hesitation to make such determinations. See
Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 501 F. Supp. 1300, 1321 (E.D. Mich. 1980), Power v.
Barry County, Mich.. 539 F. Supp. 721 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
177. More specific examples of entrenched male advantage in criteria definitions are given
with suggestions for neutralization in Remick, Strategiesfor Creating Sound, Bias.FreeJob
Evaluation Plans in Job Evaluation and EEO: The Emerging Issue 85-112 (1979).
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IV. Conclusion
The operation of the Minnesota statute exposes three major
obstacles to its objective of ameliorating the economic status of women.
The statute permits a totally inadequate appropriation, applies to only a
few women. and reinforces and continues male advantage entrenched in
determining the value of work and thus the compensation deserved. This
statute and others like it do not question the process of comparing women
to men as the means to establish or recognize fairness and equality. Pay
for the social value of women's labor envisions remuneration based on
recognition of women's contribution to society. Perhaps realization of this
cuncept will be delayed until society has more adequate standards of
%alue, worth, and work. Nevertheless, one mechanism for realizing
economic equality is to question and change the standard and criteria
which determine value in the concept of comparable pay for comparable
\\ork.
Men ha% e defined equality, value, and work in ways which produce
and reproduce economic inequality between the sexes. Women whose
worth has not been recognized and remunerated must define equality,
%alue. and work from women's perspective to transform economic
inequalit. into economic equality.
Carol Jean Pint*
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